

**THE DECISION TO INTERVENE:
ENGLAND AND THE UNITED PROVINCES 1584-1585 ⁽¹⁾**

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The English intervention in the revolt of the Netherlands in 1585 was the immediate cause of the outbreak of the undeclared war between England and Spain that lasted for the remainder of the century. It was the central episode in the history of Elizabethan foreign relations, and as such has received greater or lesser treatment in most serious histories of the reign. There is an extensive historiography. Yet it is curious that there has not yet been a detailed study of the English decision to intervene. In Anglophone scholarship two main themes have emerged: firstly that the surviving documentation is very poor and secondly that the decision to intervene represented the victory of a war party over a peace party. The attraction of the second thesis is that it would appear to explain the hesitations of the English war effort and the efforts, initiated practically immediately after the intervention, to reach a settlement with Spain that culminated in the Bourbourg negotiations of 1588 ⁽²⁾.

However, both of these are myths. The documentation is quite rich and as good as can be found for any subject in this period. It has simply not been explored very well to date.⁽³⁾ Secondly, far from being the consequence of a factional struggle, the debates over intervention saw in fact a successful effort to base it on a consensus ⁽⁴⁾. The reasons for the hesitations of the English war effort must be sought elsewhere.

The purpose of this present paper is to outline the main aspects of the course of the English decision-making, first advanced in my essay on the outbreak of the war at sea in 1591, which will receive fuller treatment in a monograph I am presently writing ⁽⁵⁾.

The period we are concerned with here is that between the assassination of William of Orange in July 1584 and the arrival of the Earl of Leicester in the Netherlands in December 1585. There is, of course, always a background. Of immediate relevance here are certain developments of 1583 and early 1584, for although the assassination of Orange was the immediate trigger for the English intervention, it did not occur in a vacuum. The diplomatic context was extremely complicated. For this three reasons can be advanced. Firstly, the three monarchs who dominated western Europe in the 1580s

—Philip II, Elizabeth I and Henry III— were either celebrated for their prudence or notorious for their vacillation, depending on your point of view. Secondly, the issues themselves were extremely complicated—far too complicated to treat adequately in a brief essay. Lastly, the conduct of diplomacy itself was far from easy. Not only did these negotiations involved a triple connection: London, The Hague and Paris, but communications across the North Sea were highly dependent on the vagaries of the weather. If messages and embassies could be delayed for weeks by bad weather, so too could information pass extremely quickly.

In the year between the death of Orange (10 July 1584) and the negotiation of the treaties of Nonsuch in the summer of 1585 there were two fixed points in the English decision-making process: a privy council meeting on 18 March 1585 and an earlier one on 20 October 1584⁽⁶⁾. The 18 March meeting is the more straightforward of the two. It was held immediately following the report that Henry III had refused the Dutch offer of sovereignty and resulted in an immediate English offer to the Dutch. The October 1584 meeting, however, is more complicated, both because the precise reasons for holding it are not clear, yet at the same time it laid out the intellectual basis of intervention in a very careful and almost formal way. The documentation for it is particularly rich.

This meeting will therefore be the focus this essay. Although the background would take us over the whole of the Anglo-Spanish relationship during Elizabeth's reign, we may note that there were two major aspects to it: the specific issue of the Netherlands and what might be called the wider relationship. By 1584 so far as the English government was concerned this wider relationship was dominated by the various catholic invasion schemes of the early 1580s. These were the consequence of a political coup in Scotland in 1581 that gave rise to hopes in catholic circles that that young James VI would take up their cause and that Scotland could become the base for an invasion of England. The various schemes were the work of English catholic exiles, a number of Scots, the duke of Guise and several papal nuncios. However, the Spanish ambassadors in Paris (Juan Baptista de Tassis) and London (Don Bernardino de Mendoza) were also involved and Philip II himself was consulted in the summer of 1582⁽⁷⁾. He was sceptical for a number of reasons, not least owing to his concern that plans in which so many were involved over so large an area would be difficult to keep secret⁽⁸⁾.

The issue took on a new aspect in the summer and autumn of 1583, following the occupation of Terciera and the completion of the union with Portugal. His next moves became the subject of intense speculation throughout western Europe: it was during these months that he first began examining seriously the *Empresa d'Inglaterra* with the Marquis of Santa Cruz and the Prince of Parma⁽⁹⁾. How much the English government knew of the various schemes during 1582 and early 1583 is a moot point, but the decisive break came with the exposure of what is known in English history as the 'Throckmorton plot' in November and December 1583. It took its name from Francis Throckmorton, one of the English catholics involved and implicated in it were several English noblemen, and both Mendoza and the French ambassador in London. Mendoza's involvement led to his expulsion in January 1584. Philip's refusal to condemn his ambassador was seen as evidence that Mendoza was acting on his instructions⁽¹⁰⁾.

A further consequence of the Throckmorton plot was an invasion panic in England

in February 1584, based on reports that Philip was preparing an invasion for the next summer. This led to the earliest surviving examination of naval preparations for defence against an invasion from Spain ⁽¹¹⁾. It also led to the making in March of an important naval agreement with William of Orange, under which the Dutch would send a fleet of twenty ships to join the English in the event of such an invasion ⁽¹²⁾. This indeed was the treaty under which Dutch naval assistance was requested in 1588; in the short term it brought England and the United Provinces significantly closer.

In point of fact Philip II had already postponed the *Empresa* in order to concentrate resources on the Prince of Parma's campaign in the Netherlands; at Parma's request the Spanish infantry released from the Azores expedition was sent to join his army. Philip also made major efforts to dissuade the Duke of Guise from further involvement given the impending crisis over the French succession. However, for the English the issue was kept alive by an accident. In September 1584 the Scottish Jesuit Walter Creighton was captured by Dutch privateers while sailing from France to Scotland. They nearly executed him but instead handed him over to the English later in the month. He was not ill-treated but remained a prisoner in London for many years. Creighton had been a key figure in the 1581-82 invasion schemes, and for some reason was carrying with him a copy of the invasion plan sent to Philip II in 1582, which he attempted to destroy when he was captured. The English appreciated that this was an old scheme, but Creighton also told them that Philip was intending to undertake the *Empresa* once the Netherlands had had been re-conquered ⁽¹³⁾. This 'confession' was to be extremely influential.

The Netherlands provided its own complexities. For the English there was also the relationship with France to consider, and this in turn brought in relations with Scotland. The attempt by the Duke of Anjou to seize power by force in January 1583 ('the French fury') had brought to a head the existing tensions surrounding his controversial involvement. On the one hand the Flemish towns were prepared to return to Philip's allegiance rather than submit to French tyranny. At the same time there were hints that Holland and Zeeland might go their own way and adopt a foreign policy of alliance with England the Germany protestants and possibly Denmark. William of Orange himself argued for maintenance of both the Union and the French alliance, on the grounds that the only source of effective aid was Henry III. In December 1583, after his return to France, Anjou proposed a new treaty based on the threat of Philip now in control of Portugal. Under this a French army subsidised by Henry III would invade Artois and Hainault in the summer of 1584; in return for this the United Provinces would be united to France if Anjou died without heirs. In mid-February after visiting his brother in Paris, he claimed (verbally) that Henry had agreed to every request he had made. This in turn became the basis for a new treaty, negotiated in April 1584, under which in return for subsidising the army Henry III would inherit the sovereignty of the Netherlands on his death – with the exception of Holland and Zeeland. This treaty was about to be ratified when Anjou died on 10 June 1584, leaving to his brother his rights in the Netherlands in his will ⁽¹⁴⁾.

Although, as his naval agreement with England showed, Orange was not totally tied to the French alliance, the decision was taken after Anjou's death to continue with the treaty by offering the sovereignty of the United Provinces to Henry III, though still with

the exceptions of Holland and Zeeland. This new treaty was in train when Orange himself was assassinated. At this point there were two undecided issues, whether Henry III would accept the treaty, and whether without Orange the Dutch would go through with it. Paulus Buys, the pensionary of Holland, whose scepticism about the French alliance had been clear for over a year, now made public his preference for one with England and the German protestant princes. In July Henry III refused to commit himself and departed on a progress to Lyons for most of the summer and autumn. However, at the end of August the sieur des Pruneaux, Anjou's former agent, arrived in the Netherlands with a proposal that if Holland and Zeeland were included Henry would accept the sovereignty. To this the States-General agreed on 9 October – at the price of Buys' resignation as pensionary of Holland ⁽¹⁵⁾.

It was against this background that the English decision was made. The news of the death of Orange reached London by special post at 4 in the afternoon of the 15th ⁽¹⁶⁾. On the 16th and 17th the English privy council appears to have met to discuss their response and this resulted in the decision on the 17th to send John Somers to the Netherlands to assess the situation. However, although Somers' instructions proceeded to the sign manual, as late as the 22nd his mission was still pending, and was then cancelled ⁽¹⁷⁾. The reason would appear to be that Joachim Ortel, the agent of Holland and Zeeland in London, volunteered on the 17th to go himself ⁽¹⁸⁾. He was, however, ill at the time, and did not depart from London until the 4th of August ⁽¹⁹⁾.

Somers' instructions had been primarily exploratory. At the same time Sir Edward Stafford the ambassador in France was instructed to discover Henry III's willingness to co-operate with Elizabeth – to which he received a very non-committal response before Henry III departed on his progress. He was to be joined by Sir Philip Sidney, but that embassy was too was cancelled by the king's progress. The French response led to further significant discussions on the English council, which are summarised in a memorandum drafted by Sir Francis Walsingham, the secretary of state 'Points to be considered touching the peril that may grow by Spain when he shall have the full possession of Holland and Zeeland', probably on 24 July ⁽²⁰⁾. Walsingham wrote on the 27th that the council had decided in principal that the Dutch would be unable to hold out alone. Even if the French did not intervene Elizabeth would have to do so to prevent Philip regaining full control, a conclusion that reflects the general thrust of his memorandum ⁽²¹⁾. In the meantime the English had received suggestions from Paulus Buys that Elizabeth should take over the protection of the Netherlands and Ortel had been joined by Jacques de Gryse, an agent for the States of Brabant, whose initial mission was to raise troops for the defence of Antwerp ⁽²²⁾.

Precisely what instructions Ortel brought from England we do not know. His departure was delayed by bad weather and he did not arrive in Delft until 22 August; his interview with the States-General thus coincided with the arrival of Pruneaux. Several of the provinces then expressed their unwillingness to prejudice the negotiations with France by treating with England simultaneously. Ortel returned to England in early September with a certain amount of information about the state of the Dutch military and their finances (which the English had requested), as well as a request for Elizabeth to supply military assistance, and a private request from the States of Holland for a direct

English intervention – probably inspired by Buys, who at one stage was proposing to accompany him to England ⁽²³⁾.

Ortel's proposals were debated by the English council in mid-September and Elizabeth decided that the Dutch requests were too costly. Instead she proposed that an Anglo-French meeting be held to discuss a joint intervention ⁽²⁴⁾. This answer was received by the States-General on 29 September – but it is not clear what effect it had on their negotiations with France. The interesting question, therefore, is what occurred between mid-September and the 20th of October to cause the English to hold another major council meeting. The October meeting was to some degree planned in advance, for at the beginning of the month Walsingham announced that a meeting was to be held on 18 October over Mary, Queen of Scots ⁽²⁵⁾. Moreover, several days before the meeting William Davison was ordered to prepare himself to go to the Netherlands ⁽²⁶⁾. It is also clear from a casual reference that a further meeting on foreign affairs was held on the 21st ⁽²⁷⁾. Little appears to have been learned from France about Henry III's intentions, and it is not clear that the Dutch decision to accept his proposals had been received in England by then. Indeed during October Elizabeth appears to have been given to understand that there would be strong opposition in the Netherlands to the French proposals ⁽²⁸⁾. The key may well have been Creighton's confession.

The surviving documents from the 20 October meeting include what appears to have been an introductory 'discourse' by Lord Burghley, a conclusion in his hand, and several other memoranda either by him, Walsingham or Sir Walter Mildmay ⁽²⁹⁾. The discussion took up the issues raised by Walsingham's paper in July and was chiefly concerned with what the English should do if the French did not intervene. Little attention appears to have been paid to a possible alliance with France. The debate started with three basic assumptions: firstly that the Dutch would collapse without foreign aid, secondly that Henry III would not co-operate with Elizabeth and therefore unilateral intervention might be necessary, and thirdly that this would in turn lead to an open war with Spain. The basic question addressed was whether England should intervene, or if not, what measures to take to counter Philip once he regained the Netherlands. Here another major assumption was made: that Philip would attempt an invasion of England once the re-conquest was achieved. The dangers of intervening or abstaining were surveyed quite widely. However, much attention was focussed on detailing the evidence for Philip's 'malice' against Elizabeth, which in turn led to a survey of Anglo-Spanish relations from the beginning of the reign, culminating in Mendoza's involvement in the Throckmorton Plot and what Walsingham termed 'the late plots taken with Creighton' and 'Creighton's own confession' ⁽³⁰⁾.

This exercise in recent history actually served two important purposes. The first was that it supplied the evidence for the inevitability of war with Spain regardless of what happened in the Netherlands. The second was to provide a justification for intervention. This was an issue that caused much concern both at this point and during the Nonsuch negotiations the following year. As Burghley put it, this was necessary 'for satisfying the world that may calluminate these the Queen's Mat's proceedings as uniuist against the king of Spaine making no warr against her' ⁽³¹⁾. One of the most revealing observations was the candid admission that they could not use the excuse for intervention that

they were seeking to keep out the French, as they had done in the 1570s⁽³²⁾. Burghley was keen to have the justification published, as was done in October 1585⁽³³⁾. Indeed it has been argued that the 1585 Declaration was ultimately derived from arguments first expounded here⁽³⁴⁾.

The issue was basically portrayed as one of self-defence. The conclusion reached was that the dangers of non-intervention outweighed those of intervening. As Burghley again put it: 'that though her Maty should thereby enter into a war presently, yet she were better to do so now, whilst she may make the same out of her realm and have the help of the people of Holland and their parties'⁽³⁵⁾. The conclusion went on to make a number of specific recommendations:

1. That someone of experience be sent to the Netherlands to discover the state of the Franco-Dutch negotiations, to support French intervention if an agreement had been made, but also to offer the Queen's help if it had not.
2. To call a parliament immediately
3. To make a settlement with James VI of Scotland.

and finally to seek the assistance of the King of Navarre, Casimir of Palatinate and the Portuguese pretender Dom António.

The last three were to be the consequences of an Anglo-Dutch agreement, but the first three were all undertaken. A parliament was summoned immediately: on the 22nd, in fact.⁽³⁶⁾ James VI was won round in the course of the winter, in one of the minor triumphs of Elizabethan diplomacy. And, lastly, William Davison was sent to the Netherlands.

However, Davison's mission does pose one question. He was warned in advance of the meeting to make himself ready and then summoned to court on the 21st⁽³⁷⁾. But his instructions were not completed until the 23rd of November, when he finally departed, arriving in the Netherlands about a week later⁽³⁸⁾. The instructions reflect the decision of the 20th of October, but is there any significance in the delay? One reason may have been that Elizabeth was ill in early November, but there may also have been something else. Elizabeth's desired solution was for some form of Anglo-French co-operation, and the English offer was never intended to outbid the French⁽³⁹⁾. But she seems to have been recurrently suspicious that Henry III's lack of interest in co-operation was part of a plan to take over sovereignty of the Netherlands on his own. She may have held Davison back until this was clearer – though in fact it never was.

The later stages of the Anglo-Dutch negotiations are actually quite straight-forward. The following months were dominated by the preparation of the Dutch embassy to France and then its slow process. Although the States General wrote to Henry III on 23 October that they were prepared to offer him the sovereignty of the United Provinces under the terms suggested by Pruneaux, the Dutch embassy did not receive its instructions until 3 December and was then trapped by winds at The Brill for three weeks. It arrived in France in early January 1585, but was then kept at arms length by Henry III for over a month. The Dutch had their first audience on 13 February and Henry finally rejected their offer on 8 March. The news of this reached London on 16 March, although the English had already drawn conclusions from Henry's prevarications at the

end of February ⁽⁴⁰⁾. On the 18th another council meeting was held. This meeting poses some mysteries for only one memorandum from it survives, entitled 'In a consultation held at the Lord Treasurer Burghley's House near the Savoie in London [8 March 1584/5]', but in five contemporary or near-contemporary copies of varying accuracy. It is in fact quite negative, which has caused some confusion, particularly since the most frequently quoted version is the least accurate and is misdated 18 March [i.e. 7 April] ⁽⁴¹⁾. However, on the following day (the 19th) a proposal of aid for the Dutch was drawn up on the basis of this meeting, which was carried over to Davison in the Netherlands by Walsingham's man of business Edward Burnham ⁽⁴²⁾. Burnham left immediately and made very good progress, arriving in Flushing on the 24th, and reaching Davison at The Hague on the 27th. He actually arrived before the Dutch delegates returned from France. Bad weather in the Channel had caused some of them to return via London and they did not reach The Brill until early April ⁽⁴³⁾. At the same time Walsingham also informed Ortel and Gryse of the proposal, and Gryse followed Burnham on 24 March. He reached Middelburg on 1 April and the States General at the Hague on the 9th, the same day that the returning embassy from France made their formal report ⁽⁴⁴⁾.

The English proposal as supplied by the Burnham memorial and by Gryse was debated in the States General during April. By 10 May the terms of an appeal to Elizabeth had been agreed and an embassy prepared to leave in a week's time. However, there then ensued a delay as the Estates of Zeeland were unhappy about the agreeing to the English demand for the occupation of Flushing as a 'Cautionary Town' ⁽⁴⁵⁾. On 31 May Zeeland finally agreed to go along with the rest of the provinces, and on 6 June the embassy received its final instructions ⁽⁴⁶⁾. However, although they initially embarked at The Brill by the 17th, they were again delayed by bad weather and also the threat of privateers from Dunkirk and did not arrive at Margate until 3 July. When the Dutch arrived Elizabeth was at Greenwich Palace, where she received them, but then moved during July to Nonsuch near Hampton Court, a palace built by Henry VIII, which, although now in private hands, was a favourite summer residence of hers. Although the two treaties were signed there on 12 and 20 August, the negotiations themselves took place at a number of locations in London as well as the court during July ⁽⁴⁷⁾.

The Nonsuch negotiations were complex. There were major political and constitutional issues at stake that shaped the future Anglo-Dutch political relationship, particularly whether Elizabeth would accept the sovereignty of the Netherlands or act solely as protector. Sovereignty, the Dutch choice, implied that the United Provinces possessed it and were able to bestow it, but it also involved an existing constitutional precedent. Protectorship, Elizabeth's preference, left open the possibility of a settlement that recognised Philip's ultimate sovereignty, but no one on either side had any real idea of what it would involve in practice. At the same time there was the issue of the level of military assistance she was prepared to supply (and what she would demand for it) and then what was known as the provisionel secours, immediate English participation in the relief of Antwerp. The two Nonsuch treaties (the first being for the provisionel secours, and the second for aid during the war) were negotiated under some pressure and can legitimately be termed hastily drafted. A number of major issues were either left unresolved or open to varying interpretation, and these complexities were further bedeviled

by the two versions of the Act of Amplification drawn up in London in September and the Hague in October to deal with the situation arising after the surrender of Antwerp. Many of the tensions in the Anglo-Dutch relationship over the next few years can be traced back directly to Nonsuch⁽⁴⁸⁾. Nevertheless, at the end of the day they were points of detail – however important – the basic decision had been taken in October 1584.

Looking at the whole year from July 1584 to July 1585, the key factor was the vacillation of Henry III. Had he made clear his opposition to intervention in the summer and autumn of 1584, the Anglo-Dutch treaty would probably have been made then. The French ‘decision-making’ process is far from clear, indeed by comparison with both the English and the Dutch it was extremely murky. The case can be made that Henry was ultimately dissuaded in 1585 by pressure from the house of Guise and Don Bernardino de Mendoza, and this was certainly advanced afterwards, not least by Henry himself. Yet his earlier dislike of his brother’s Netherlands adventures and his initial statements in July 1584 that he had no desire to involve himself in the Netherlands at all must also be taken into account. This would at least give his position a certain consistency. The mystery is why he allowed Pruneaux to make the Dutch an offer in his name in August and September 1584.

We can conclude with one or two observations about the effect of these negotiations on Philip II. One person who did take French intervention seriously was the Prince of Parma. If the combination of the arrival of the reinforcements from Spain promised the previous autumn and the death of Anjou in July 1584 encouraged him to undertake the siege of Antwerp, his primary motive for pushing ahead with the siege during the winter of 1584-5 was to prevent it being pre-empted by a French invasion of Flanders⁽⁴⁹⁾. Neither he nor Philip appears to have been particularly worried by the possibility of English intervention. Indeed neither was served effectively by intelligence of English affairs. Since the beginning of the decade Philip had been concerned by the dangers posed by the English (Sir Francis Drake in particular) at sea, and made serious efforts to obtain accurate intelligence about Drake’s activities. It was widely known that Drake was planning a major voyage in 1584, but in early 1585 it was in abeyance. Since Bernardino de Mendoza’s expulsion in January 1584, both Philip and Parma relied for intelligence on England on the network Mendoza had left there, and Mendoza’s main agent, Pedro de Zubiaur, was arrested by the English in May 1584⁽⁵⁰⁾.

This lack of intelligence contributes to the mystery surrounding Philip’s arrest of shipping in Spain in May 1585, but the argument that it was some form of warning to Elizabeth not intervene in the Netherlands is unsubstantiated⁽⁵¹⁾. It rests on Cardinal Granvelle’s long-expressed opinion that the English were particularly vulnerable to economic warfare, but evidence that Granvelle was involved in the king’s decision is yet to be advanced. I see no reason to alter the argument I put forward earlier that the arrest was inspired by inaccurate intelligence that Drake had left England with a fleet and the need to assemble shipping against him. The resistance of the London ship *Primrose* to what Philip regarded as his legitimate right caused him to seize all English shipping in Iberian ports in retaliation⁽⁵²⁾. But whether he saw this as ultimately affecting his relations with England is another question.

Parma’s lack of concern can be attributed in large part to his immediate desire to

bring the siege of Antwerp to a successful conclusion. Philip, on the other hand, was increasingly worried about the French succession. This was something the English did not pay much attention to until the publication of the Declaration of Peronne in April 1585 - after the decision to intervene in the Netherlands had been taken. The English decision was based less on a desire to bring about any particular solution to the Dutch Revolt than on a perceived threat of invasion by Philip, once he was in a position to do so. It was essentially an acceptance of the inevitability of war with Philip, and a decision to fight it on the most advantageous terms. Paradoxically, invasion was not an immediate threat in 1584-5; for Parma was never enthusiastic about the Empresa d'Inglaterra and Philip, partly through his influence, had agreed to concentrate on the Netherlands first. It was the very English intervention that converted him to the Empresa in the winter of 1585-86.

NOTAS

- ⁽¹⁾ The study of international relations in the period covered by this paper is complicated by the introduction of the Gregorian calendar. To simplify matters all dates in the text follow the Gregorian calendar, but references in the notes to English documents employing the Julian calendar will use the split date.
- ⁽²⁾ The factional argument was first made in C. Read, 'Walsingham and Burghey in Queen Elizabeth's Privy Council', *English Historical Review*, xxviii (1913), pp. 34-58, see esp. pp. 54-7. For more recent examples see, R. Wernham, *The Making of Elizabethan Foreign Policy 1558-1603*, University of California Press, Berkeley and London, 1980, pp. 9-10, W. MacCaffrey, *Queen Elizabeth and the Making of Policy 1572-1588*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1981, pp. 337-39, and C. Martin and G. Parker, *The Spanish Armada*, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1988, p. 98.
- ⁽³⁾ The major single loss is the Privy Council register for the period June 1582 to February 1586. The registers are not records of debate or discussion, but they provide a great deal of information about the implementation of policy.
- ⁽⁴⁾ The factional interpretation of Elizabethan politics is surveyed in S. Adams, 'Favourites and Factions at the Elizabethan Court', J. Guy (ed.), *The Tudor Monarchy*, Edward Arnold, London, 1997, pp. 253-74, reprinted and revised from A. M. Birke and R. Asch (eds.), *Princes Patronage and the Nobility: The Court at the Beginning of the Modern Age c. 1450-1650*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991, pp. 265-288.
- ⁽⁵⁾ S. Adams, 'The Outbreak of the Elizabethan Naval War against the Spanish Empire: the Embargo of May 1585 and Sir Francis Drake's West Indies Voyage', M. J. Rodríguez-Salgado and S. Adams (eds.), *England, Spain and the Gran Armada 1585-1604*, John Donald, Edinburgh, 1991, pp. 45-69. The monograph will have the title *The Decision the Intervene: England and the Revolt of the Netherlands 1584-1585*.
- ⁽⁶⁾ Other points are the publication of Declaration of Peronne, 1 April 1585, Philip II's embargo of shipping in May and June 1585, and the treaty of Nemours between Henry III and Catholic League 7 July 1585. However, the last two occurred while the Anglo-Dutch negotiations were in train and the Declaration of Peronne was issued after the 18 March council meeting.
- ⁽⁷⁾ J. Kretzschmar, *Die Invasionsprojekte der Katholischen Mächte gegen England zur Zeit Elizabeths*, Leipzig, 1892 is still the best introduction.
- ⁽⁸⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 94.
- ⁽⁹⁾ See J. Calvar Gross et al. (eds.), *La Batalla del Mar Océano: Corpus Documental de las Hostilidades entre España e Inglaterra (1568-1604), Volumen I: Génesis de la Empresa de Inglaterra de 1588*, Instituto de Historia y Cultura Naval, Madrid, 1988, arts. 328 (Santa Cruz to Philip, 9 August 1583), 335 (Philip to Parma, 12 September), 341 and 351 (Parma to Philip, 11 October, 30 November).
- ⁽¹⁰⁾ There is no full account of this complex affair and a number of key points remain unclear. L. Hicks, *An Elizabethan Problem: Some Aspects of the Careers of Two Exile Adventurers*, Burns & Oates, London, 1964, is detailed but argues a tenuous thesis. J. Bossy, *Giordano Bruno and the Embassy Affair*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1991.
- ⁽¹¹⁾ PRO, SP 12/168/4-6, A memorial of divers things necessary to be thought of and to be put in execution for this summer for the strength of the realm to serve for martial defence against either rebellion or invasion [by Lord Burghley], 3/13 February 1584.
- ⁽¹²⁾ 'Articles proposez a Monseigneur le Prince d'Orange par Monsieur Dyer'. The original, sig-

ned by Orange at Delft, 3 March 1584, is now BL Cotton MS Galba C VII, fos. 288-9. There are copies in the ARA (RA I-97), and the PRO (SP 103/33/91-2). Public Record Office documents in the classes SP 103, 83, 84 and 77 are calendared in *Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series, Elizabeth I*, though the originals should also be consulted for key points.

- ⁽¹³⁾ A. Clifford (ed.), *The State Papers and Letters of Sir Ralph Sadler*, Constable, Edinburgh, 1809, ii, p. 400-1, Walsingham to Sadler, 16/26 September 1584. See also Hicks, *Exile Adventurers*, pp. 235-8.
- ⁽¹⁴⁾ M. Holt, *The Duke of Anjou and the Politique Struggle during the Wars of Religion*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, pp. 200-11, provides the most convenient survey of Anjou's last negotiations with the Dutch.
- ⁽¹⁵⁾ J. de Tex, *Oldenbarnevelt*, 2 vols., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1973, i, pp. 35-6. See also *Cal. SP For., 1584-5*, HMSO, London, 1916, p. 119, George Gilpin to Walsingham, 25 October/4 November 1584.
- ⁽¹⁶⁾ As recorded by the exiled Scottish presbyterian minister, James Carmichael. D. Laing (ed.), 'Letters and Papers of Mr. James Carmichael, Minister of Haddington, 1584-1586', *Wodrow Miscellany I* (Wodrow Society, Edinburgh, 1844), p. 418, Carmichael to the Earl of Angus, 6/16 July 1584.
- ⁽¹⁷⁾ The signed instructions are PRO, SP 83/22/art.34.
- ⁽¹⁸⁾ *Cal. SP For., 1583-4*, HMSO, London, 1914, pp. 600-1, Ortel to Leicester, Walsingham, Burghley, 7/17 July 1584. Ortel had been appointed in the previous summer. Although then a follower of William of Orange he was also very much the protégé of Buys.
- ⁽¹⁹⁾ PRO, SP 83/22/57, Ortel to Walsingham, 25 July/4 August 1584.
- ⁽²⁰⁾ There are two copies of this memorandum: PRO, SP 12/171/141, an undated list of questions, and BL, Cotton MS Galba C VIII, fos. 94-5, a later copy, which includes answers to the questions, dated 14/24 July 1585. The year is probably the copyist's error for 1584.
- ⁽²¹⁾ *Cal. SP For., 1583-84*, p. 622, to Stafford 17/27 July 1584.
- ⁽²²⁾ Buys sent his views to England both by Ortel (see PRO, SP 83/22/art 48, Ortel to Walsingham, 17/27 July) and through the English agent William Herle (see PRO, SP 83/22/53, Herle to Elizabeth, 22 July/1 August 1584). Gryse was sent on the 16 July and arrived by 1 August.
- ⁽²³⁾ *Cal. SP For., 1584-85*, pp. 23, 37, 25, 38. N. Japiske, (ed.), *Resolutiën der Staten Generaal 1583-4*, Rijksgeschiedkundige Publicatiën, The Hague, 1919, p. 512.
- ⁽²⁴⁾ *Sadler Papers*, ii, p. 395, Walsingham to Sadler, 2/12 September 1584. A number of memoranda survive from these discussions in various English collections.
- ⁽²⁵⁾ *Ibid.*, ii, p. 409, Walsingham to Sadler, 30 September/10 October 1584.
- ⁽²⁶⁾ PRO, SP 83/23/22, Walsingham to Davison, 5/15 October 1584.
- ⁽²⁷⁾ PRO, SP 12/173/111, Burghley to Walsingham, 12/22 October 1584.
- ⁽²⁸⁾ *Cal. SP For., 1584-5*, p. 86, Walsingham to Sir Edward Stafford, 2/12 October 1584.
- ⁽²⁹⁾ There are multiple contemporary copies of several of these memoranda. The most accessible copy of the introduction 'A discourse by way of questions and answers to the same, affirmative & negative, concerning the present state of the Low Countreys upon the death of the Prince of Orange' is PRO, SP 83/23/art. 26. The conclusion, 'The Resolution of the Conference had upon the Question whyther hir Majesty shuld presently releve the States of the Low Contryes of Holland and Zeland or no' (in Lord Burghley's handwriting) is PRO, SP 83/23/art. 28.

- ⁽³⁰⁾ PRO, SP 12/173/103-v, 'The principal matters wherewith the K of Sp is to be charged of ill dealing towards Her Majestie', endorsed by Burghley, Mr. Sect. Notes X Octob. 1584. PRO, SP 83/23/ arts. 25 and 29 are further lists of Philip's hostile actions in Burghley's handwriting.
- ⁽³¹⁾ PRO, SP 83/23/art. 26.
- ⁽³²⁾ *Ibid.*
- ⁽³³⁾ *A Declaration of the Causes mooving the Queene of England to give Aide to the Defence of the People Afflicted and oppressed in the Lowe Countries*, London, 1 October 1585. A modern reprinting can be found in A. Kinney (ed.), *Elizabethan Backgrounds*, Archon Books, Hampden, Conn., 1975, pp. 197-211.
- ⁽³⁴⁾ C. Read, 'William Cecil and Elizabethan Public Relations', S. Bindoff *et al.* (eds.), *Elizabethan Society and Government*, Athlone Press, London, 1961, p. 41. MacCaffrey, *Elizabeth and the Making of Policy*, pp. 341-2.
- ⁽³⁵⁾ 'Resolution', PRO, SP 83/22/art. 28.
- ⁽³⁶⁾ See the file of writs for the elections, PRO C 219/29.
- ⁽³⁷⁾ PRO, SP 12/173/108, Walsingham to Davison, 11/21 October 1584.
- ⁽³⁸⁾ His instructions are PRO, SP 83/22/45 (dated 13/23 November). For his arrival see *Cal. SP For, 1584-5*, p. 162, Davison to Walsingham, 21 November/1 December 1584.
- ⁽³⁹⁾ For Elizabeth's illness, see *Cal. SP For, 1584-5*, p. 135, Segur to Walsingham, 1 November 1584. The files of the States General include a letter of credence dated 31 October/10 November (ARA, SG 11106, fos. 1v-2), which suggests that any decision to delay his departure occurred in mid November.
- ⁽⁴⁰⁾ Walsingham reported the news from France in a letter to Davison of 7/17 March (PRO, SP 84/1/124). Presumably it was the letter from the English ambassadors Stafford and the Earl of Derby of 3/13 March (Bodleian Lib. MS Tanner, 79, fo. 234) to which he was referring, though this would imply a very quick post. The earlier English suspicions are found in *Cal. SP For, 1584-5*, pp. 287-8, Privy Council to Davison, 18/28 February.
- ⁽⁴¹⁾ This is BL, Harleian MS 168, fos. 102-5. There is not space here to discuss the technical problems presented by this memorandum.
- ⁽⁴²⁾ Two copies of the 'Memorial for Burnham' survive, PRO, SP 84/1/130-2 and BL, Harleian MS 285, fo. 123. The misdating of the Harleian MS 168 copy has caused earlier students to miss the connection between the two. The Earl of Leicester also wrote a quick note to Davison on the 8th/18th, informing him of the positive outcome of the meeting, PRO, SP 84/1/126.
- ⁽⁴³⁾ See *Cal. SP For, 1584-5*, pp. 382-3, Davison to Walsingham, 26 March/5 April. For the Dutch in London, *ibid.*, pp. 375-6, Ortel to Walsingham, 24 March/3 April.
- ⁽⁴⁴⁾ Ortel and Gryse's report on their discussions with Walsingham and others after 18 March is ARA, RA, I-90B, to the States General, 24 March (printed in M. van Deventer, *Gedenkstukken van Johan van Oldenbarnveldt en zijn Tijd*, 3 vols. The Hague, 1860-5, i, pp. 62-9). It was carried over by Gryse himself. For his arrival, see CSPF, George Gilpin to Walsingham, 25 March/4 April, and his appearance in the States General, *Resolutiën der Staten Generaal*, 1585-6, Rijksgeschiedkundige Publicatiën, The Hague, 1921, p. 44.
- ⁽⁴⁵⁾ The demand for Cautionary Towns as both political and financial security had been a feature of earlier Anglo-Dutch negotiations, but they had also been conceded by the Dutch in the 1584 negotiations with Anjou and Henry III.

- ¹⁴⁶⁾ The procuration for the delegates of Zeeland is dated 31 May. That for Utrecht was as early as 29 April (the originals are now PRO, E 30/1160, 1164). For the final instructions, see *Resolutiën der Staten Generaal 1585-6*, pp. 56-62.
- ¹⁴⁷⁾ The best account of the Nonsuch negotiations is the rapport of the Dutch embassy, which provides a daily record of the proceeding. The manuscript (ARA, SG 8299) has been printed in extract in Deventer, *Gedenkstukken*, i, pp. 78-102, and in extenso in 'Rapport van de Nederlandsche Gezanten en 1585', *Kronijk van het Historische Genootschap*, 5th ser., ii (1866), pp. 215-77. There is no equivalent in English, though there are numerous English policy memoranda.
- ¹⁴⁸⁾ This argument can be found in F.G. Oosterhoff, *Leicester and the Netherlands 1586-1587*, H&S, Utrecht, 1988, pp. 45-7.
- ¹⁴⁹⁾ L. van der Essen, *Alexandre Farnèse, Prince de Parme, Gouverneur Général des Pays Bas (1545-1592)*, 5 vols., Nouvelle Société d'Éditions, Brussels, 1930-1937, iii, pp. 218-9, iv, pp. 33-35.
- ¹⁵⁰⁾ Adams, 'Outbreak of the Naval War', pp. 49-50.
- ¹⁵¹⁾ As advanced in Martin and Parker, *Armada*, p. 100.
- ¹⁵²⁾ Adams, 'Outbreak of the Naval War', pp. 56-7.